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1. For some time I have been striving to understand just exactly 
vhat it t~~es for something to be a generative grarr:.rn.ar. The 
nature of my concer~ ·.nth this question is not that of a meta-
theoretician ~ithin the discipline, nor that of a philosopher of 
science looking at our field from the outside; it is rather that 
of an easily confused Ordinary Working Grammarian who is trying 
to be minimall:, clear about what it is that he is doing. 
The ordinary working granunarian of whom I speak has fairly 
special and fairly limited ~a::.rs of troubling himself with the 
problems I will be discussing, and he has special and limited 
reasons for being pleased or displeased with a theory. For 
example, when the ordinary working gre.mma.rian is told that a 
generative grammar of a. language is a recursive device which 
demarcates exhaustively and exclusively the unlimitedly large set 
of senter..ces in the language, -what that means to him is that the 
theory gives hin a test for knowine whether what he has done, in 
descrioing a certain language, has been successful: if he discove~s 
sentences in the language which his gl"a.mmar fails to recognize, 
or if he notices se~uences vhich his grW"...mar allovs but the 
language does not, then he knows that his ef!'a:rts have fallen 
short of complete success. 
If the ordinary vorking grammarian is told that he can capture 
generalizations that would otherwise escape him only by adopting a 
particular notation or a. particular set of conventions rega..rdin~ 
the form and intet"J)retation of grammatical rules, what that means 
to him is that the grammatical descriptions he vrites should be 
simpler if he uses these notations and conventions than if he does 
not, and that grammars written by people who adhere to the sa:me 
conventions will be interpretable to him. 
Further 1 when the ordinal""/ working grammarian is told that 
the model of grammar with which he should work must contain in 
its notation or in a.n auxiliary set of conventions a bod.,v of 
assumptions about language universals, he is .rilling to accept 
this, not so much because he is pleased that in this ~ray the theory 
abstracts properties or the basic human psychic apnaratus 
*An earlier version of this paper was in need of surgery in several 
places, and the surgery was performed. I a.~ grateful to the 
diagnosticians Arnold Zwicky and Stanley Peters. 
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for language out of the cultural diversity of individual. languages, 
'but because this decision makes it posdble for him not to have to 
remember all the things he believes to be true about language in 
general: to the extent that his beliefs about language universals 
are embedded in the notations he uses, he will alvays knoc1 vhen 
to be surprised by new evidence which contra.diets one or another 
of these beliefs. He knows that when he encounters linguistic 
facts which he cannot a~ticulate with the notational and concentual 
apparatus at his disposal, he has correctly detected a crisis in 
the theory and is now in a position to revise his beliefs about 
language. 
Our grammarian, we have seen~ is essentially lazy, and, 
indeed, almost 'practical 1 in his views about vhat theories a.re 
for. 
I am going to claim that the ordinary working grammarian is 
confused a.bout ~hat it takes for something to be a generative 
grammar. Before I go on to explain nr.rself, I must report immediately 
that we do not find him guilty of the much-discussed confusion 
between 1genera.te 1 ,a.s a stative verb used to relate a grammar and 
the sentences of the language it is a gra.mmar of~ and 'generate' 
as an active verb used of a huma..~ being and the utterances he 
produces. The ordinarJ working grammarian knows and is careful 
about these distinctions.l 
1rt is not so easy to keep these notions distinct in one's 
unconscious, I must admit. I continually find that I am attracted 
to whnt is called 'generative semantics' or back again to 'inter-
pretive semantics' depending on whether I have recently been more 
impressed with rn:,r experiences of wanting to sa.y things I do not 
know how to express, or with my er.;ieriences of having said things 
which I cannot understand. In the former mood I am convinced 
that the mechanism inside me for constructing well-formed messages 
is intact, and that what is mal~unctioning is the component ,._,hich 
maps messages into utterances; when I em in the latter state I 
feel that the mechanimn for producing grammatical sentences is 
intact: and that vhat is defective is the apparatus for assigning 
meanings to them. 
I mu.st also explain, before I go on, that the ordinary working 
grammarian I have in mind finds himself fairly solidly vithin the 
generativist camp. His doubts about generative grammar do not 
arise from any ass\Unptions about the superiority of the research 
goals of the taxonomists or distributionists of a decade or t•,m 
ago. Tb him, the data do not deter.mine the conceptual base of the 
theor.r; they constitute, rather, the phenomena which the theory 
has to explain. And this vas something he learned from the 
generativists. 
For the snke of the younger reRder, let me interpret my 
allusions. I am old enough to remember the da1rs when, as a t~.rpical 
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classroom demonstration of analytic procedures in linguistics, 
the professor presented a pair of linguistic forms, demonstrated 
on the basis of the distribution of their constituent elements 
that they are analogously constructed, and then continued by 
pointing out that their external distribution shows them to be 
distinct. I contribute the following examples for illustration: 
the pair 'maternity dress' and 1paternity sµit'. It is easy to 
believe that there e.re distributional parallels in English-
language texts between 'maternity' and 1paternity 1 , and thet the 
distributional properties of 'dress' e.nd 'suit' a.re analogous. 
However, on exa.~ining the external distribution of the t.....,o-vord 
expressions, '\.'e ·~Tould discover that they are in fact quite 
distinct, in that they occur in vastly unlike total context sets. 
Some of rn.,v teachers took the trouble to say that wh€n a linguist 
claims that tvro forms a.re gro.mmatically distinct, all he means, 
in fact, is that their total context sets a.re distinct. 
Today reasonable people are much more likely to say that there 
is something a.bout what these expressions ~ which accounts 
for their different distributions, rather than the other way 
around; and such reasonable people might be said to be ta..J.dnp; the 
e;enere.tivist position. To the challenge that these two ways of 
talking a.bout the facts amount to the same thing, I reply that 
in the development of a generative description, one would notice 
the internal si~ilarity of 'maternity dress' and 1paternit:, suit 1 
only by accident; in the development of a distributionist account, 
the comparison of these forms is a necessary step in their 
individual description. 
2. My topic, then, is the way in which a 1genera.tive' linguist 
conceives the relation between a grammar and the objects which 
the grammar is designed to identify and describe, i . e. , the 
1gra.rnmatical 1 sentences of the language in question. 
In the earliest discussions of generative grammars, a 
comparison was suggested between writing a grammar and specifying 
the set of well-formed formulas in a mathematical system. In 
Choinsk:.,,· (1957, u. 13) we :read, 11The fundamental aim in the 
linguistic analysis of a language Lis to separate the 1gre..rnm.atical 1 
sequences which are sentences of L from the 9ungre.mmatical 1 
sequences which ar-e not sentences of Land to study the structure 
of the granunatica.1 sequences. The grarnnar of L will thus be a 
device that generates all of the grammatical s-equences·of Land 
none of the ungrammatical ones." A generative grammar recognizes 
certain strings of symbols as well-formed sentences in the language, 
but not others, much in the manner of the formation rules in a. 
mathematical system. 
This function of a grammar is interpretable as being identical 
to one of the unarticulated goals of the traditional grammarians, 
the difference being that a. generative gra.'It.mnr is one in which 
the characterization of the totality of well-formed sentences is 
made explicit. To mention a.n aspect of such a suggestion ,.rhich 
comes quickly to mind, it seems quite likely that some traditional 
grammarians, and many classroom grrum:iarians, ma:, indeed !laYe been 
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~illing to think of a grammar as analogous to the system of formation 
rules in a mathematical system--that is, in the quite literal sense 
that in both cases the rules ·,1ere devised by wise and rational 
creators, for the creators I o•,,.n purposes, and that the admission or 
rejection of a presented formula or sentence was to depend on 
whether or not it was in conformity ~ith these ineependently 
valued rules, A mathematical s:rntem and a syste!:'. of g:±-a.'11.matictl 
rules upheld by proponents of the doctrine of correctness are both, 
after all, man-made. 
Explicit ~enerative gram.'llars anpea.red on the scene, fo:rtunatel;v, 
ate time vhen the question of the rnembershin of a sentence in a 
langua£e was taken es an empirical issue. 0n the de facto, as 
opposed to the de .jure, theory of p;ra'7!l'!le.ticality, the speaker is 
the source of the lan13:uage, a.nd a successful generative p;re.mmar 
is one which conforms in its predictions to certain kinds of 
Judgments made by speakers of a laneuege about the sentences in 
their language. A proposed grammar cen be shO"..rn to be incorrect 
by a demonstration that the set of sentences in the langua~e is not 
the same as the set of sentences recognized by the granur.ar. 
That. at least, vas the goal which grrunmarians learnen to set 
for the~selves. In the face of this first requirement, it is 
clear that what the ordinary workin~ ~ramrnarian needs to find out 
is the identity of the set of de facto gre.r.unatical sentences, and 
~hat he needs to figure out is whether the gran"'1!lar he constructs 
puts the good :sentences in and rules the bad ones out. We ;;ill 
see soon that this requirement is a difficult one. 
In addition to the requirement that a p.re.rnma.r identif'J each 
of the grammatical sentences of the language, the conce~t of 
gene:rative grammar comprises the further condition that it associate 
with each of the sentences it generates a structural description--
a dis~lay of nll of the gra.r.una.tical information a.bout the sentence 
which the speakers of the la.ngua~e can be said to possess. Our 
rirst two reauirements are Phrased in Katz {1966. n. 123) as 
follow·s: "th~ rules of a li~g,.1istic description mu~t not only be 
capable of producing an infinite list of formal objects, but the 
formal objects on the list must be the sentences of the languap;e 
under study and the list must exclude any string in the vocabular:,1 
of the language that is not a sentence in the lanp.;uage. Furthe:!"-
more, these rules must sol'lehov specif'J e.11 the information a.bout 
the sentences that a. speaker utilizes to ~roduce Rnd understand 
them." 
The second requirement does not comr.iit us to anything nev in 
the actual workings of a gr·a.'Tl!l'la.r. The very rules which play a. 
~art in the successful generation of the sentences of the langua~e 
can be used, via a structure-assignin.r;,: alf,Orithm ta.ken to be na.rt 
of linguistic theory, to provide the corr~ct structural descri~tions. 
As stated in Thorne (1968, p. 302}, ''The set of rules involvea in 
the generation of a sentence is eq_uivalent to an analysis of it. 11 
With the concept of generative /!:!"a:mrnars thus elaborated to 
contain the notion 'correct structural ne::::cription', the relation 
between grwnma.r and the set of lin@:uistic ob,jects it gene:-ates is 
subtler the.n was apparent at first. 'I':'le native-speaker judp;ments 
,. 
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to which the analyst needs to a.r,pea.1 fol' convincinp: himself' that  
his work is adequate involve not only acceptance or re.1ection of  
sentences, but also assent to va~ious kinds of assertions about  
the sentences that are accepted,  
Our ordinary working grammarian looks at this new responsibiUty  
and sees two problems: first, whether he can determine what the  
correct structural descriptions of the sentences in the languages  
!3.re, and second, whether the rules needed for generatinP, the  
sentences in the first sense are indeed precisely those which  
will succeed in assigning correct structural descrintions. The  
ordinary working gremmarien •..rorries, i~ other words, about whether  
there is really a definitional relation between a descrip_t1on of  
everything speakers know a.bout the sentences of their le.ngua.p;e and  
grammatical rules of the ty--pe he has learned.  
From the beginning, but only with seriousness in work later 
than Chomsky {1957), the concept of generative grammar has been 
further enriched by the requirement that it be capable o~ ranking 
sentences along a dimension ranginl!. from the fully grammatical to 
the totally unstructured. It was ap:parently believed by Chamsk,y 
that for this new role there need b-e no new req_uirements on the 
fom and operation of the generati,;re apparatus itself. In Chomsk=r 
and Miller (1963, p. 291) we read that a generative grammar, defined 
!!:§.. a device which enumerates the gra.m..~atica.l sentences o~ a langua~e 
and which assigns structural descriptions to each of these, may 
also be regarded~ a device which assigns to any string presented 
to it a relative-gra.nunaticality index. What is neeaed, apparently, 
is some system of conventions which governs the way in which the 
structure-assigning apparatus is to be consulted for determininv., 
for any non-sentence, its degree of departure from full grammaticality. 
The ordinary working grammarian, confrontinB this added 
responsibility,· sees now three things to vorrJ" about. The first 
is whether he or anyone he trusts knows hov to rank sentences 
according to their degree of deviation from full gram..maticalit:'.{; 
the second is whether there is a general way of determining, from 
the rules of the granunar, a ranking of sentences which conforms to 
these judgments. His t:iird problem is that he fails to understand 
wh.,v knowing vhat is wrong with each of tvo senten~es should entail 
knowing whether one of them is ~orse off than the other. 
One final enrichment of the concept of generative grammar is 
found in the view that a grarr.me.r which a grammarian constructs is 
a claim about somethinp; which speakers of the langua.ge have inside 
their skins and which makes them able to produce and comprehend 
the sentences, and many of the near-sentences, of their language 
(see Chomsky (1965, pp. 3-9)). Hith this addition the study of 
grammar talces on a new interest and importance, naturally, but 
vith this addition one finds it particularly difficult to imaffine 
in advance the precise nature of criteria for success. !twill 
be my conclusion, nevertheless, tha:t the most intellip;ible iriew 
of grammatical research sees it as the attempt to discover the 
internal rules which account for the rule-gu.ided aspect of hUI!lan 
linguistic abilities. 
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3. The most simply conceived geaJ,; of a generative graJtlllla.r, to go  
back to the beginning, is that of d.1;t~rmining, for any seqti.ence of'  
elements in the vocabulary of the language, whether it is grammatical  
or ungrammatical.  
Tne details of the technical side of this task are of little reaJ. 
interest to the ordinary w~rking grammarian. He knows that to the 
extent tbat a.ny gen~ine generative gra:m:mar is an effective.theory, it 
will a.1-.,1ays be possible to tell; if a sentence is generated by the 
grammar, that it is generated by the grwr.mar: one tries out the rules, 
using whatever heuristic one has at hand, until one finds.the sentence 
in question, and declares that it is in. There is, to be sure, another 
issue--that of knowing for certain that a presented string is !£1,gra.."1Ul'.atical 
according to the gra.mmar--but that question is related to subtle 
properties of grammars that are of little concern to the ordinary w9rkin~ 
gra.mma.~ian. H~ is willing to assume that an interpreter of a generative 
grammar~ given vit, luqk and patience, vill be able to find out one way 
0~ another whether a given sentence is in or out. 
What does concern him is the non-technical problem of knowin~ 
whether the sentences that get in a.re the good ones and vhether the 
sentences that get left out are the bad ones--whether, in other words~ 
the grammar and the speakers make the same choices. He sees this as a 
problem because he knows that Jud~ents about grammaticality are subject 
to all sorts of confusions between grain.maticality and significance, 
acceptability or intelligibility; he knovs that even when speakers say 
they understand that they a.re to make judgments about grarnmaticality 
rather than these other things, they still disagree; he knows that 
sometimes people change their minds about whether a sent;ence is P,:r~msnati-
cal; and he finds ap~eal.s to unending idiolecta.1 variation some~hat 
unsatisfying. 
There was a time vhen these uncertainties would not have bo-thered 
our grammarian: a decade ago there was little reason to doubt the 
Clea.r C~es Principle proclaimed in Chomsky (1957. pp. 13-14). On 
this princi:ple, na.tive-spee.ker judgments are criteria. of gra.rnma.r-
constructing success only with respect to the clear cases, The 
grammarian begins by conside~ing sentences like "I like ice-cree.m" that 
a.re clearly gra.mmatical and sequences like nice-cream me the" that 
are clearly ungrammatical, and he constructs the simplest ~re.rnmar 
which generates all the incontrovertibly grammatical sentences a.nd 
fails to generate all the incontrovertibly ~grammatical. sentences. 
The. grammar, then~ and not the grammarian 1 me.kes the decision a.bout 
the unclear cases. 
Tode;r's gra.nunarian finds little com.fort in this principle, because 
he knows, if he has read Ross's thesis (Ross 1967), that the kinds 
of arguments that seem to bear very crucially on the nature and 
operation of syntactic systems involve him in grar.ima.ticality decisions 
that are extremely difficult to make. If he has seen the Elliot, 
Legum and Thompson (1969) studies of speech variation, he knows 
that properties of grammars and sentence configUrations figure 
ilµportantly in the description of idiolectal and siylistic differ-
ences, but not at all in a way that gives any primacy to a simple 
distinction betveen being in the lan~uage or out, being generated or 
not generated by the grammar. 
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The simplegt criterion of success, ~hich ~as to consist of  
checking the identity between being 1 in the language' and bein~  
1 generated by the erammar', does not do, in sho::-t, what our  
ordinary working gra,;unarian had hoped it would do for him.  
4. But let us turn to another problem, that of designin~ a 
gram!Uar capable of assignin~ degrees of ~rammaticaJ.ness. 
Chomsky's theory of relative graJ!'Jr,aticality (see Chomsky 1965, 
pp. 148-151) takes roughly the followin~ fol"'!!l. The grrunma.r 
generates the set of fullj• f!ra.mma.tical sentences in a. more or less 
straightfo::--ward ~ay. For a. strin~ of words not found amon~ the 
fully gra.."l!Jlletical sentences, its de.l!'.ree of deviation frori full 
gra....,;unat:!.ca.li t.y can be computed by comparing it with the ttrarnmatical 
sentences to which it is in some we.ys si.mile.r. 
The procedure may be t:1ou12;ht of as including somet11in;,:: like 
the following steps. For each deviant strinF, one identifies the 
set of sentences ~aximnll.Y similar to it, One identifies the 
properties ..·hich the deviant and the grmrnna.tice.1 sentences have 
in common and in doing that one isolates ,1ust those properties 
which a.re 'out of place'. If an 1out-of-place 1 element is a 
constituent of o. major category not found in that position in 
the gramnatical sentences, the deviation is particularl:.r serious--
...,e may sa:r that the string loses three points. Where an out-of-
place elerr.ent is of an appropriate category but has grammatical 
properties not found in that position in any of the fu.lJ_y 
gra..11111a.tical sentences, the deviation is of r:iinima.1 se!"iousness--
the string loses one point. Where an out-of-place element is of 
an appropriate major category according to part of its context 
but requires ordinarily a. ca.te,gorial environment of a. type not 
found in the string in question, the offense is of medium 
seriousness--the string loses two points. The degree of deviance 
of the string as a whole mi~ht be registered, in the most simple-
minded rendering of this procedure, as the sUJP. of the values of 
these various offenses. 
The deviance-computing procedure I have just sketched, as 
well as subtler variations on it, has to be based on the assumption 
that it is in principl~ possible to identify, for a deviant strin.;;, 
just those lexical items or features ¥hich are out of place, or 
just those orderings of elements which are inanpronrie.te. Biren 
if we e.gree to allo·.. multiple ways of recognizing the out-of-place 
elements--that is, even if we a.re willing to record ce·rtain strings 
as ambiguously deviant--we still must face the ill-defined problem 
of determining vbich portion of a deviant strin~ provides the 
framework ~ithin which the rest can be described as out of place. 
For any attempt to deal ..~th this task, we have to distin8llish 
between a deviant string of words taken in the abstract and a 
deviant or mistaken utterance. We will find for the former that 
there is simply no possibility of determininp; in any absolute 1-1ay 
its degree of departure from full grammaticalit;t. In the latter 
case, an account of deviant utterances 111Ust take two cases into 
account: mistakes, as in the speech performances of children, 
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drunkards and foreigners (and the rest of us when we are off our 
guard), where what is of interest is a cOttIµarison between vhat 
was intended and what was said; and figurative speech, where 
vbat is o:f' interest is the structural ty-pe .,.•hich the speaker 
wants the hearer to perc~ive as the framework upon which the 
hearer 1 s 1 construin~ 1 abilities can im~ose some sort of inter-
pr-etation--hopefully the intended interpretation. 
To see what is involved for strings of words considered in 
vacuo, we can take the most favorable case --that of strinRs -
w:nfcii". happen to be identical to sentences generated b~r a. grB..l!':.me.r 
which differs in minor 'v{a.ys :from the gra'nl;!ar wh:i,ch p:rovides t:ie 
measure. Suppose, for example, that we vish to say something 
about the sentences produced by a spee..~e~ of a nonstandard 
dialect of English and suppose that we wish to determine whether 
it me..~es sense to talk a.bout the degree of deviation of his 
sentences from those o~ the standard dialect. 
Te.lting the single sentence (1), what we need to knov first 
of all is vhether it is to be compared with {2) in the standard 
dialect or with ( 3) • 
(l) I seen it. 
(2) I have seen it. 
(3) I saw it. 
Depending on which of these is taken to be the basis of comparison, 
the sentence is deviant either by virtue of an omission or by 
virtue of a substitution, If the index we need is something 
which grades strings of ·.rords along the grwmnaticality dimension, 
it must be a meaningful question to ask whethe~ the string comes 
out as more ungra!llll'.atical under one of these interpretations 
than under the other, and it must likewise make sense to ask 
vhether the intuitions of native speakers of the standard dialect 
can be called on to decide which interpretation is correct. Such 
inquirJ, surely, does not lead to an understandin~ of where (1) 
fails with respect to the standard dialect, and we are motivated 
to look for other kinds of information to tell us this. 
Of course, in order to kno,;.r which com11a:rison is the •:right' 
one, we need to know 7hether the rules of the dialect from which 
we have taken our sample allo•..r the perfect auxiliary I have' to 
be contracted to zero (where the standard dialect requires retention 
of the final fricative), or whether these rules specif;{ tseen 1 
as the preterite form of 'see'. In case the source dialect has 
nothinf, corresponding to the standard dialect contrast between 
{2} and (3)~ our problem is more serious still: are we to say 
that the dialect hes only the perfect form, vith the aux.iliar.t 
deleted; that it has only the preterite fo:rm, realized phonologically 
as 'seen 1 ; or that, having the two constructions distinct at some 
level of analysis, the graronar neutralizes them in surface sentences? 
The answers to these questions involve detailed comparison of the 
gratnmatical rules of the separate dialects, but can in no 
meaningful way, as far as I can tell, be expressed as info:t"?!'.ation 
about (1) as viewed from the standard dialect, 
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With (1) we ha.ve the simplest possible case, and yet  
there vere these uncertainties. The situation with random word  
sequences is totally beyond hope. That becomes obvious as soon  
as we realize that the possibilities available ror matching e.ny  
one of these with a set of grammatical sentences include the  
operations of order change, insertion, deletion or renlacement  
of elements, and unrestricted co~binations of these.  
For utterances that a.re deviant by mistake, the relevant  
comparison is bet¥een the actual utterance and the intended  
utterance, but in this case, {i) it is not a.l.·.ra;'rs possible to  
know what the intended utterance is, and (ii) it does not matter  
whether the actual occurring utterance is, in the abstract,  
gra.'l'lffiatical or not.  
What is needed is some apparatus for pairing an:r strings of 
words ·,dth any structural description, and :providing some index 
of the degree of fit bet-:.re.en the description and tbe string' the 
value of this index determined by an operation which relates the 
lexical information associated with the individue..1 1.rords of' the 
string wit~ the structural description. Such a device is what 
ve find elaborated in La.koff (1965). By Le..~off's procedure, any 
string will have an indefinitely large number of grarnnaticality 
values according to the infinite number of structural descriptions 
that can be brought into association with it. For a fully 
graimnatical sentence there will be at lea.st one structural 
description which it satisfies completely. An ambiguous grammatical 
sentence will show perfect fit with tvo or more structural 
descriptions--one ~or each of its possible interpretations. 
Working out the details requires giving different weight to 
distinct types of 'poor fit 1 • All such decisions will involve 
appeals to native-speaker judgments o-r some sort, but technically 
the thing seems feasible. 
But notice what happens to our understanding of the working 
of a. generative grammar vhen we adopt Lakoff 1s device. The 
syntactic component specifies the set of well-formed structural 
descriptions. The dictionary component associates with each 
lexical item e set of syntactic, semantic, and phonologictl 
properties, the syntactic properties understood as including informa-
tion about inl'>ertability into deei:,-s tructure confirnu-a.tions ana. sensitivi ty 
to grammatical rules. The relative gramnaticality algorithm 
automatically assigns a grammaticality index to each ordered pair 
in which the first element is a sequence of lexical items and the 
second is a structural description. 
Under Lakoff 1s proposal a generative grammar can do what I 
think Chomsky suggested a genere.tiYe grammar ought to do, i.e., 
serve as a grammaticality-index assigning mechanism. But the 
whole thing depends crucially on having correct information about 
the lexica.i. items or the language, How are we to discover, our 
ordinary working grammarian asks, what are the correct lexical 
properties of the words and morphemes of a language? Can it be, 
he frets, that the difficulties of knowing correctly the gra!rullar 
and semantics of lexical items are of the same order of magnitude 
as those of determining the grammai;icality o:r sentences? 
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These worries of his are, I think, justified. Presumably,  
we are to determine the grammatical properties of lexical items  
by comparing deviant with non-deviant uses of them. We know  
that 'resemble' is unpa.ssivizable, for example, because  
spea..lters of English tell us that while (b) is grammatical, ( 5)  
is not.  
(4) John resembles a horse. 
( 5) A horse is resembled b:r John. 
But, in fact, there are some speakers of English vho tell 
us that the passive sentence is not ungrammatical, That means 
that vhen we observe a seer.tingly deYiant use of a lexical item. 
ve must ask whether this usage constitutes a departure from 
conventions provided by that speaker's language, whether the 
speaker's language differs in relevant ways from the lMP,Ua~e we 
have been considering, or whether his judgments on grammaticality 
are sometimes inaccurate. In other words, we must be able to ask 
whether the speaKer regularly uses the word in ways of which the 
observed usage is a.n instance, or -whether in this situation he 
made a mistake, 
Two examples will demonstrate the difficulty in knowing 
what the facts are. The first is an elementary case of fii:nrrative 
s~eech. W'hile it is certainly- possible to come up with clear 
cases, it is frequently in practice inpossible to know, even in 
onets own speech, whether a word has been used figuratively, in 
the creative sense, or whether it is simply poJ.ysemous in the 
needed way. The use of tne word 'bitch' in referring to an 
unpleasant adult female human was clearly figurative in its 
first instance, but when we find peovle ~ho hesitate to use the 
word when speaking of a female dog, it is apparent that for them 
the insulting sense of the word involves no appeal to their 
creative abilities. A description of this state of affairs in 
te:rms of the marking of deviance would run like this: somebody 
vhose lexicon contains onl.,v the literal interpretation 9f the 
noun but who is observed to use it nevertheless when referring 
to human beings has made a creative extension of the scope of the 
word that is accounted for by reference to the knowledge that 
participants in our civilization use attributions to human bein~s 
of non-human animal properties for pejoration; somebo~y ~ho does 
not use the word when referring to female dogs lacks the orit;inal 
sense and has a lexical entry for 1bitch' with the pejorative 
sense built in rather than acquired by a construal princi~le. 
Unfortunately~ an empirically indistini:;ui_shable account is 
found in the claim that some speakers have two descriptions of 
the word, others only one. On this interpretation, the acquisi-
tion of the non-literal sense is an event in the history of the 
language. I know of no reasonable proposals for evaluatinp; 
these alternative accounts, 
For a second example, I turn to the fact that some speakers 
of English do not use 'convince' in the sru:ie ways they use 
'persuade'. They allow themselves to say {6) but not (7), 
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(6) We persuaded him to come.  
{7) We convinced him to come.  
Suppose, knoving that, we hea.r our informant say (7). We zria,:1 
sey that his internal gra.:mmar makes the distinction just mentioned, 
but that he has generalized the infinitive complement construction 
to the verb tconvince' tnis one time; or that he is in the 
process of acquiring the more generalized rule; or that he vas 
imitating speakers of a lesser dialect; or that he mistakenly 
produced this utterance by choosing the word 'convince' when he 
intended tpersua.de'; or, of course, we might simply se.:r that in 
his le:xicon 'con,rince' and 1persua.de 1 are given, a.part from their 
phonology, identical descriptions. 
There are, then, uncertainties about the proper VB:!{ of 
interpreting apparently different uses of lexical items and 
uncertainties about the accessibility of correct lexical informa-
tion in general. A~pea.ls to introspection, the compilation of 
questionnaire results, e.nd claims about idiolectal variation 
seem not a.lvays to point to the truth. Grammatical theory needs 
instead to consider deviance marking as a precise fo:nnal problem, 
and this it can do by a:pplyini:i; to lexical descriptions something 
akin to La.koff's proposal for computing relative grammaticality. 
The lexicon is a device which characterizes well-formed lexical 
entries but rails to associate phonological material (i.e., 
tlexical items 1 ) with lexioa.1 descriptions. Graii'.matical theory 
can now be thought of as providing a wa;,r of registering the degree 
of grammaticality of word strings vith respect to structural 
descriptions if the lexical descrintions of the words are kno·.m. 
This is accomplished by associating any sequence o~ clusters of 
lexical features--minus the phonological content--vith any 
structural description. Tbe grammar is able to assign indices 
of relative grammaticality, but only to ordered pa.irs of lexical 
desc;ription sequences and structural descriptions. The gram.mar 
says, in effect: if you can find strings of words that have such-
and~such properties, then I can tell you exactly how vell they 
fit an,y structural description, 
If this is what a generative grammar is to do; it has 
managed to get as fa~ as possible from its initial goal of 
specifying the well-formed sequences of ·.rords. The fact is, 
of oourse1 that vhen we took this step we completely lost the 
attention and interest of our ordinary working grammarian. He 
wants to know Just what these deviance markings are for~ and he 
has serious doubt$ about whether the speaker 1s intuitive judgments 
on grarrJ11aticaily deviant sentences can be accounted for in 
general in terms of misordering errors and cetegoey substitutions 
cf the sort he sees this device capable of detecting. Our 
grammarian knows first of al1 tha~ the construal principles for 
a great many instances of metaphor involve understandings about 
objects and events rather than properties of the linp.:uistic ele~ents 
which give expression to these objects and events. More than that, 
he can think of many cases of what he insists on considering deviant 
uses of language but which cannot be described by any of the 
grammar-bound pla.ns for characterizing that have been proposed. 
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I have in mind a situation iike the following. Journalists 
these 	days have been made conscious of the jeopardy to ,1ustice (or 
at least the danger of a libel suit) that results from puhlic 
assignment of guilt to their fellow citizens. They have been 
instructed to heed certain rules of thumb that ere supposed to 
keep 	them out of trouble, a.nd among these, I assume, are the 
following: "Never S!cy of a person who committed a crime that he 
did it, only that he allegedl;z: did it," "Never call the person 
who cor.imitted the crime the culprit, or the murderer, or the 
burp;la.r, until after the tri a.l; cal1 him instead the sus_pect. 11 
As a 	 result of sincere obedience to these injunctions, 
journalists (perhar,s most noticeably in CollL~bus, Ohio) have 
acquired odd uses of the adverb 'allegedly' and the noun 'suspect'. 
Recently I heard on the evening television news in Columbus: 
(8} Six members of the Students for a Democratic 
Society were charged with allegedly aistributin~ 
inflar.imatory literature. 
(I a~ 	assuming, incidentally, that they vere char~ed with actuall:r 
distributine; inflru:una.tor:1 literature; if they vere o:1ly char~ed 
with 	allegedly doing this, then they vere surely 1;Uilty, and. 
my point is lost.) In a report on the burglary of a milk store 
in r:ry 	 city, the local e'Tening newspe:oer reported that 
(9) 	 The police have no clues e.s to the identit:,, of 
the su.spect. 
There was of course no suspect: they he.d no clues on the identity 
of the burglar. 
These are assuredly deviant uses of the ·.;ords in question, 
and I believe they vould be reco~nized as such by their authors 
i.f they had had time to edit vhe.t they had written. But it seems 
to me tha.t a correct description of the nature of the deviance is 
not the sort of thing that can be provided by a ~enera.tive gra.rnr!'lar 
rigged to assign eramma.tice.lity indices. I may be wrong, but I 
find it difi'icult to imep:ine how such an a.lRorithm could successfull:r 
mark the two sentences I ca.me across as bein~ more acceptable in 
journalese than such technically equally odd sentences as (10} or 
(11). 
(10) 	 He wanted the c~ildren to allegedly rob the flover-
girl, 
(11) 	 I hope no suspect burns our house do·.,m while we're 
on vacation. 
The deviant uses I have been discussing simply do not involve caterror:r 
errors of fSJlliliar kinds. 
Uncertainties a.bout the -.rays in which lexical ite:r.ts fiimre in 
the ope~ation or a deviance-marking apparatus brings one face to 
face with the question of analogy in sneech behavior. Althoup:h I 
have a.greed with and once contributed to the bod:'r of unkind vords 
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people have directed toward a little book called State of th~ Art 
(Hockett, 1968) 1 I find myself convinced that in the descri"Ot:ion 
of changes in the l~xicon, the appeal to changes in the cont~nt 
or gra"M!latical rules faces a number of serious difficulties.! 
Consider the recent popularity of event nouns used in the context 
of social protest in which the first element is a verb and th'.e 
second element is the preposition 'in 1 , as in I sit-in 1 , 1love:...in 1 , 
etc. I believe I a.'!l correct ir: my understanding tha.t I sit-in:, was 
the first of these. The ordinary vo~king grammarian in me ~onders 
how we are to describe what hn.:ppened vhen 'sit-in' becaJ'le a nart 
of the English lexicon. Were there cha.n.p;es in the deriva.tional 
rules of the language? Was it registered as an unanalyzed lexical 
i tern? Or •.that? 
If 'sit-in' entered the language as an unanalyzed lexical item, 
then it had no influence on the rules, since only generative rules 
assign structural descriptions. If the word did have an analysis, 
then there either nust be some supplementary apparatus for assii.:ninp. 
structure to lexical items, or it must be taken as being generated 
by a possibly newly created generative rule. 
Suppose we take thi~ last position, since it is the only one 
that is intelligible within the framework of generative gre.Illii1B.r. 
What is the nature of this newly created rule? !f the rule is 
stated as one ~hich takes an,.v verb, shall we say that 'sit' was 
marked, ror a while, as the only verb to which it could a?ply? 
Shall be say that the scope of the rule was perfectly general, and 
merely observe as a fact about the history of usage that nobody 
bothered to use it for anything butt.he verb 'sit' for the :first 
few months after the introduction of the rule? (If the a.ns'lver to 
this second question is yes, then we must understand the occurrence 
of the later words in the way that ~e understand the constructi-
bility of novel sentences.) 
But if the original rule ~as an exceptional one, applyin~ only 
to 'sit' , then wha.t are ve to say about such late!' a.ddi tions a.s 
•wade-in', 'prey-in 1 and 'strip-in'? Are we to sa.,Y that at the 
later stage the rule became generalized so as to include any verb, 
or any of' a certain type of ,,erb, or are we to say that the grammar 
became more complicated by virtue of having the relevant exception 
features added to the verbs 'wade', 1pr~y 1 , 'love• and the rest? 
If we a~cept that the rule was originall:.r general enough to include 
any verb, in some strict sense of •verb'; was it in fact general 
enough to include the later hippy creation 'be-in'? If not~ with 
the extension to 1be 1 are ~e to say that the rule was further 
generalized or that it was made more specific so a.s to include •·ne'? 
These are all, quite obviously, senseless questions. It 
would never occur to anyone toda...v to line up all these alternatives 
and to worry seriously about which is to be pre~erred, if only 
because we remember how silly certain older works see!"! in which 
ve are taught five alternative analyses of' the 1,1ord 1took 1 • We 
have here one of those cases where .re r.iight indeed agree to say, 
with Hockett, that somebody made UP a word, the word caught on, 
other people apprehended a pattern and made up some new words on 
the same pattern. A reconstruction of this history in the for~ 
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of a sequence of changes in the systems of generative rules would 
strike the ordinary working grM"narian as nothin~ more than 
alle~iance to a ritual form. However ~e eventually mana.~e to 
deal with descriptive problems of this sort, it is at lea.st very 
clee.r that in none of this inquiry would it have been of a.n~.r hel-o 
to have available to us a met:-ic of relative gra.'l!l!1atice.li t;1·, 
5, I have said that it is difficult to see ho.; e generative 
gram..,nar can be required to demarcate a.11 and onl~t the P,rammatical 
sentences or a la.nF,uage in view of some rather serious ouestions 
about the empirical determinability of that set; and I have said 
that it is impossible to ima;:;;ine any ·,•ay in which e ~enerative 
gra..,nmar can assign grammaticality indices to deviant sentences. 
I turn no'\l to a brief consideration of the wa:,,s in which a ~e.mme.r 
assigns structural descriptions to t:-ie sentences which it i:i;enerates, 
The theorJ or transformational grru:unar makes available for 
structural descri:9tions of sentences (i} the categories of the 
base rules, {ii) the dominetion relations that are defined init:il:3.lly 
by the rules of th~ base and are adjusted by the transformations, 
(iii) the left-to-right sequence of elements. {iv) information a.bout 
nermitted co-occurrences i.n narticular structures end (·,r) info'I"ll!ation 
found in the lexicon rega..rdi~g (a) insertability into deep-structure 
configurations, (b) sensitivity to gra.wnatical rules, and (c) the 
semantic structure of lexical items, A /U"~'!l11lar is judaed as adenuate 
in one important respect if it describes sentences in Ya:rs which 
match certain sorts of intuitive Judgments on the nart of native 
speakers, if it captures certain aspects of their knowledge about 
the sentences. 
One specific descriptiv-e problem, ordinaril:'t tak.en to be the 
easiest, is that of knowing whether a p;rammar gives the correct 
constituent-structure e.ne.lysis to the surface sentence. Considerin~ 
the variety of ways in which complex verbal expressions in English 
get parsed, I a~ ready to assume that native-spee.ker intuitions 
about constituent structure are among the least important criteria 
for Judging the adequacy of proposed descriptions. 
But it is also likely that there are a great many facts about 
the grammatical interpretation of sentences which the devices of 
categories and sequence and domination fail to ca.pture alto~ether, 
yet which must be a part of the generative gra.rnmerian 1s added 
burden if the got1.l of a.chie-vinp: descriptive adequacy is to be 
seriously sought a.:fter. Iha-vein mind a number of descriptive 
problems connected with the treatment of focus, topicalization, 
reference, deep structure cases, presuppositions, and illocutionar:r 
act potential. The brute force method of incorporatinp; all these 
matters into the theory is by letting assertions a.bout them find 
their place in }'Jroposed underlyin~ structures for sentences. The 
people called generative semanticists have been accumulatin~ 
reasons according to which the underlyin~ lin~istic structure 
of the sentence 
(12) Did I give you the other book? 
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will ultimately have to be something which, when rendered into  
English, would sound like this:  
(13) 	 There is a set of books that both you and I YJlOW 
about and the cardinality of that set is some 
number n and you and I have just had in mind a. 
subset containing n-1 of those books and! a..~ 
nO"~ calling your attention to the remaining nth 
book. There was a time when I had that book in 
my possession and I am now asking you to tell me 
whether I did anything in the past which would 
count as causing that book to be in your possession. 
The speech act .function of the sentence is made explicit in the part 
about the speaker's requesting an answer from the hearer; the 
presuppositions a.re captured in the clauses preceding the operative 
clause; the category of definiteness is reconstructed as a set of 
assUlll.ptions about what the speaker believes the hearer to be 'having 
in mind'; and so on. 
\lhen the ordinary working gra.:mma.rian sees such demonstrations, 
he is properly overwhelmed, but he has trouble believing that the 
principles by which these maximally abstract r¢1'resentations are 
to be mapped into the sentences or his language are principles that 
toda~t 1 s gra..nunaria.ns are equipped to discover. He feels, in fact, 
that he i'inds himself' in the age of what ve might ce.11 the New 
Taxonomy, an era. of a. new a.nd exuberant ca.taloguinp; of' the enormous 
range of facts that ling;~ists need eventually to find theories to 
deal with. The attempt to capture fully the native speaker's 
intuitions about the structure and content o~ his sentences ha3 
led to obserrations -which make it extremely difficult to believe 
in the simple and comforting things we believed in, about grammatical 
theory, just a few years ago. 
6. I see in much recent vork a shift of interest away I"'rom the 
properties of an apparatus needed solely for generatin~ the proper 
set or sentenc~s, toward the mechanisms ~hich speakers of a language 
can be shown to have, on the basis of any evidence within reach, 
which account for their ability to do vhat they do when they 
c.t»mmunicate with ea.ch other using their language. This switch of 
emphasis to the system 1tsel£~ and away from the in-or-out Jud,!1;1llents 
associated with the strict notion of generative ~re.mmar, makes it 
possible to ask new kinds of questions. Let me give an example 
of wha.t I mean. 
When grammar-construction is seen as a purely formal task, 
one of the desiderata of a grammar must be its completen2ss. In 
evaluating a. grammar which is to generate all and only the sentences 
of a language, we cannot tolerate a situation in which symbo1s are 
introduced at one point and never interpreted or operated on by 
later rules, It is ~ossible, I want to suggest, that a grammar 
which exhibits the workings of a natural language cannot meet such 
a requirement. 
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It ma.y be tha.t an earlier portion of a. grammar -allows the 
introduction of a structure even though the remaining rules of 
the grammar fail to assien it a.n acceptable surface form. For 
types of phenomena that have concerned Perlmutter (in Perlmutter 
1968)~ such a failure is to be accounted for in terms ot'_surface-
structure constraints. Surface-structure constraints, however, 
make up a fairly clearly-defined segment of the grammar itself~ 
and their Justification is based on their contribution to the task 
of isolating gre.mma.tical from ungrammatical strings. The issue 
I am about to brinf, up is different. 
In general, tae questions in English are constructed by addinh 
to an~., asserti•te sentence an interrop;a.tive piece which contains 
as subject a. pronoun vhich matches the surface sub,1 ect of the r.i.ain 
sentence, and a ~ro-verb-phrase which corresponds to the predicate 
of the ma.in sentence and vhich is negative in case the main sentence 
is affirmative, and vice versa. tfnat we need to be e.ble to SB.)' 
about English is that a tag Question formative can be chosen ~ith 
any assertive sentenc~ but the rules for constructing tag questions 
out of such combinations fail to cover all cases. 
People have trouble with tag questions after ~uch sentences 
a.s 
(14} Somebody's out there. 
(15) Someoody tried to get in.  
{16) I '-m competent to do that.  
(lT) One of us could go.  
The rule for fon,,...ing the tag question requires the selection of 
an appropriate pronoun. 1Somebody' is human and sin~lar and 
unmarked for gender. 'It' is non-human, 1he 1 and 'she 1 are narked 
for gender, and 'they' is plural. There is no pronoun which matches 
1 someoody' . From the paraphrasabilit:r of (14) vith (18), many 
people say (19), but others end up with {20) or (21)~ and still 
others give up, 
(18) There's somebody out there. 
(19) Somebody 1 s out there, isn't there? 
(20) Isn't he? 
(21) Aren't they? 
For a sentence like {15), some people say (22) , and others p:ive un, 
I have heard myself say {23). For (16) some people acce-pt {24), a 
great many allow themselves to say ( 25) , but many others simpl~r 
do not know what to say, For {17), the best thinP, is to make a 
joke out of it, as in (26). Our grammar sometimes fails us. 
(22) Didntt they?  
{23) Didn't there?  
(24) Aren't I 
(25) Ain't I? 
(26) One of us could go, couldn't you? 
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Observations like are certainly familiar, and for 
illustrating my point I could just as well have considered the 
rules for s~bject-verb agreement and their failure to yield 
gra.wnatica.l sentences corresponding to (27) and (28). 
(27) Either- he or I is? alvay-s on dut:tr. 
(28) Either he or :ram? always on duty, 
The recognition of problems of this sort is the recognition 0£ 
vhat people try to say, ho~ their graJ!".mars fail them, and how 
eventually they invent a new form, they go ahead and sa.y some-
thing they feel is un~rs.l!'..matical, or they give un. To account 
for such situations we must al.lo~ grammars to be 'incomplete 1 in 
Just the right weys, that is, for just those situations in which 
the creative part of a gra."nrll.ar sets ~P something vhich the inter-
pretive pert cannot cope with.2 
2 -
It,should be pointed out, incidentally, that the discovery 
of this sort of operative failure in a grammar offe~s no comfort 
to those persistent spokesmen for the inherent vagueness of 
gram..'ll.a.rs. Grarnr:na.:.::-s mey indeed have areas of unimprovab!e va.gu,eness, 
but the facts about English that I have been discussing can be 
made totally eA"'Plicit. What the native speak.er the 
unpression of vagueness is his uncertainty about knovin~ what to 
do when he wants to say something which his greirsm.ar--in ways 
unknown to him--fails to allow him to say. 
7, The ordinary working grammarian learns what he can about the 
grammatical processes which are available to the producers of 
sentences, a.nd he uses ¥hat he knows of these processes for describing 
these sentences. He welcomes Chonsky 1s discussions of the non-
accessibility of correct grammaticality judgments, because without 
the Clear Cases Principle to guide him, he knovs of no way to 
bring to his task of ·writing a grammar the evidence of gra..'!!lllaticality 
judgments. He wants to know what sorts of' things can go w:rong 
in the production of an utterance, and what kinds of freedom creative 
u;;;ers of language have for constructing sentences or near-sentences 
in their language. He doi!S not vant to be responsible for a 
relative grammaticality ra.nking of uttera."lces or utterance/des~ription 
pairs. 
He will be glad if he can be reassured that his success as a 
gramr.i.a.rian will not be measured on the basis of' his a.bili t:r to 
demonstrate that his granana.r does everythin~ that generative ~ra..'7ll'!1ru"S 
have been said to he.veto do. I belieYe he deserves such reassure.nee. 
Knowing vhat he does not have to do will not giYe him reliable 
insights into vhat he does have to do, unfort~nately, but that is 
because the ordinary workin~ gra.'f!marian ! have in mind is exactly as 
confused as I am about that. If be is a practitioner of' the New 
Ta:xonow.y, he is having a good time. It is possible to remain happy, 
for a while 1 without well-defined ~oals. 
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